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ABSTRACT
Stable democratic regimes depend heavily on the "consensual
unity" of national elites. So long as elites remain disunified,
political regimes are unstable, a condition which makes
democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns merely temporary
oscillations in the forms unstable regimes take. Disunity
appears to be the generic condition of national elites, and
disunity strongly tends to persist regardless of socioeconomic
development and other changes in mass populations. The
consensually unified elites that are necessary to stable
democracies are created in only a few ways, two of the most
important of which involve distinctive elite transformations.
After elaborating this argument, we examine the relationship
between elites and regimes in western nation-states since they
began to consolidate after 1500. We show that our approach makes
good sense of the western political record, that it does much to
clarify prospects for stable democracies in developing societies
today, and that it makes the increasingly elite-centered analysis
of democratic transitions and breakdowns more systematic.
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWNS:
THE ELITE VARIABLE
The unexpected wave of democratic transitions during the last
decade, most notably in Latin America and Southern Europe, has
attracted much scholarly attention (see, inter alia, O'Donnell et
al. 1986; Malloy and Seligson 1987; Baloyra 1987; Needler 1987).
Although this new body of work has considerable value, it offers
no sound theoretical basis for judging the survival prospects of
newly democratic regimes. Scholars have focused primari1y on the
antecedents and processes of democratic transitions, and have
avoided the task of prediction. Thus, comparative politica1
sociology today is not much closer te\ a workable theory of stable
democracy than it was in the 1960s and 1970s when many putatively
stable democracies fell to a wave of authoritarian regimes, which
was a1so unanticipated theoretically (see Linz and Stepan 1978;
Collier 1980).
In thinking about the determinants of stable democracies,
however, there has been a promising shift in causal focus away
from social structural and toward political determinants
conceptualized in terms of the behavior of powerful actors or
elites. This new emphasis has in turn introduced a large element
of indeterminacy. Some scholars now suggest that democratic
transitions and breakdowns are ultimately the products of
historically contingent elite choices (e.g., O'Donnell and
Schmitter 1986; Lopez-Pintor 1987; Malloy 1987). Although this
shift in causal focus is a step forward, it may lead to a dead-
end if it is not substantially elaborated. The elite concept is
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fraught with problems, and the contingent nature of elite choices
may be a barrier to theoretical progress.
We suggest a route out of these and related difficulties.
Briefly, we argue that democratic transitions and breakdowns can
best be understood by studying basic continuities and changes in
the internal relations of national elites. A disunified national
elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of
unstable reqimes that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and
democratic forms over varying intervals. A consensual lv unified
national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a
stable reqime that may evolve into a modern democracy, as in
Sweden, or Britain, or the united states, if economic and other
facilitative conditions permito Unless regime changes are
preceded or accompanied by elite transformations--from disunity
to consensual unity, in cases of democratic transitions, or from
consensual unity to disunity in cases of democratic breakdowns--
they should be regarded as strictly temporary. However, such
elite transformations rarely occur. Once created, each national
elite type strongly tends to persist, with the disunified type
being nearly ubiquitous, both historically in Europe and Latin
America and among Latin American and non-western countries today.
consequently, most regime changes that have been examined as
democratic transitions or breakdowns are more fruitfully viewed
as underpinned by continuing elite disunity and associated regime
instability. Failure to see this has led many scholars to
exaggerate the longer-term significance of such transitions and
breakdowns, and left them unprepared to explain the reversals in
regime form that typically follow.
The thrust of our argument is not new. Many scholars have
shown that the unity of national elites is one of the most
important determinants of regime forms (e.g., Pareto 1935; Mosca
1939; Aron 1950; Castles 1974; Putnam 1976; Huntington 1984).
But this idea has not been developed systematically. Disunified
and consensually unified national elites are not well defined,
their origins and persistence are largely unexamined, and the
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consequences of their internal organization for regime forms are
poorly understood.
The following section outlines a theoretical perspective
that begins to correct these problems. Then our theoretical
claims about the connections between national elite unity and
regime stability are examined in a review of major western
political changes that have occurred since about 1500. We
demonstrate that the connection between elite disunity and regime
instability has been more widespread and persistent in historical
and contemporary nation-states than is commonly recognized. We
conclude by considering how our analysis informs current
discussions about democratic transitions and breakdowns.
CONCEPTUALIZING ELITE VARIATIONS AND REGIME CONSEQUENCES
We first specify our frame of reference and organizing concepts.
The unit of analysis is the independent, territorially-
consolidated nation-state, a political entity that is at least
moderately demarcated territorially and administratively
centralized on basic matters like policing and taxing (see
Giddens 1987, pp. 116-21). Our principal interest is to explain
how domestic elite interrelations affect regime stability.
Though we recognize that elite-regime relationships are
sometimes changed fundamentally by wars, we do not intend to
explain such events. And while the political importance of
location in the world economy is undeniable, we think that
international economic forces do not normally determine elite-
regime relationships (see, Brenner 1977; smith 1979; Linz and
Stepan 1978; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Malloy 1987).
Finally, we recognize that sUbnational, regionally-based ethnic,
religious, linguistic, and other cultural conflicts sometimes
override elite-regime relationships and require different but not
necessarily contradictory concepts and models (e.g., Lijphart
1978).
within this frame of reference, we conceive of national
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elites as persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative
positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever
kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and
sUbstantially (Burton and Higley 1987a). Scholars generally
agree that national elites can be defined as top position-holders
in the largest or most resource-rich pOlitical, governmenta1,
economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural
organizations and movements in a society (see Putnam 1976: Higley
and Moore 1981; McDonough 1981; Dye 1983; Hoffmann-Lange 1987;
Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987). We think of regimes as basic
patterns in the organization, exercise, and transfer of
government decision-making power. Many distinctions among regime
types can be drawn (e.g., democratic, authoritarian, and
totalitarian), but we stress the value of distinguishing between
stable and unstable regimes.
Scholars who focus on the variability of national elites
generally distinguish three basic types: (1) the "pluralistic"
or "consensually unified" type that exists in most western
societies today and that existed in a few of them in earlier
times: (2) the "totalitarian" or "ideologically unified" type in
nation-states organized along communist, fascist, or theocratic
lines: (3) and the IIdivided" or "disunified" elite of many past
and contemporary nation-states (Aron 1950; Dahrendorf 1967;
Putnam 1976; Welsh 1979: Burton and Higley 1987a). We focus here
only on consensually unified and disunified national elites
because understanding their differences and their strong tendency
to persist clarifies the analysis of democratic transitions and
breakdowns.
A national elite is consensual lv unified when its members
(1) share a largely tacit consensus about rules and codes of
political conduct amounting to a "restrained partisanship"
(prewitt and Stone 1973: Di Palma 1973), and (2) participate in a
more or less comprehensively integrated structure of interaction
which provides them with relatively reliable and effective access
to each other and to the most central decision-makers (Kadushin
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1979; Higley and Moore 1981). This combination of tacit
consensus on rules of the game and comprehensive integration
disposes elite members to view decisional outcomes as a
positive-sum or "politics-as-bargaining" game, rather than a
zero-sum or "politics-as-war" game (Sartori 1987, p. 224). with
agreement on the rules of the political game and with decision-
making access assured, the diverse and heterogeneous members
accept various decisions they do not especially like because
they expect to get their way on other issues they consider vital.
Over time, most e1ites achieve their most basic aims, and are
therefore inclined to view the totality of decisional outcomes as
positive-sum (Sartori 1987, p. 229).
This explains why elite persons and factions who regularly
take opposing ideological and policy positions in pUblic
consistently refrain from pushing their differences to the point
of violent conflicto Typical elite members therefore enjoy
considerable personal security, in the sense that they do not
expect to be killed, imprisoned, or similarly penalized for
ending up on the losing side of a policy dispute. It follows
that, once this type of national elite is created, and so long as
it persists, forcible seizures of government power by one or
another discontented faction will not occur. Moreover, to
accommodate and process the diverse , frequently opposing
interests of the factions in such a national elite, political
institutions will be structured along representative, at least
proto-democratic lines, though the actual extent of
representative democracy may depend on other, facilitative
conditions.
By contrast, a national elite is disunified when its
members (1) share few or no understandings about the proprieties
of political conduct, and (2) engage in only limited and sporadic
interactions across factional or sectoral boundaries. The basic
situation of persons comprising this elite type is one of deep
insecurity--the fear, usually rooted in experience, that all is
10st if some other person or faction gets the upper hand.
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Accordingly, members of a disunified elite routinely take
extreme measures to protect themselves and their interests:
killing, imprisoning, or banishing opponents, fomenting
rebellions against ascendant factions, expropriating opponents'
resources, and so on. In the context of elite disunity, these
actions are often the most rational ones available. Recent
experiences of having punitive measures taken against them or
their close associates, and the strong belief that such measures
will be implemented in the future, solidifies the fears and
insecurities of disunified national elite members. So entrenched
are these fears and insecurities that elite disunity can be
transcended only in extraordinary circumstances.
We have few direct and comprehensive empirical studies of
disunified national elites. Members seldom cooperate in such
research because they fear it will be used against them.
Researchers who persist in studying a disunified elite do so at
considerable personal peril. One direct and relatively
extensive study is McDonough's (1981) 1972-73 survey of the
Brazilian national elite, minus the governmentally dominant
military elite which refused to cooperate. McDonough's research
portrays an elite divided into military-governmental, economic,
church, and urban labor factions which were polarized over rules
of the political game (e.g., freedom of political opposition and
the extent of executive power), and were isolated from each
other. Brown's (1969, p. 441) more limited survey of French
elite groups in the mid-1960s--just a few years after their
conflicts toppled the Fourth Republic and the Algerian imbroglio
spawned considerable intra-elite violence--concluded that the
outstanding feature of the French national elite was "the lack of
agreement concerning the basic political institutions of the
nation" and an absence of extensive personal contacts among the
main elite factions (p. 441). In related fashion, Shonfeld's
(1981) study of French elites in the early 1970s found extensive
personal ties among elite members in the main factions but lack
of ties across factional lines. Importantly, each faction was
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ignorant of and disregarded the other. In the same vein, in
Czudnowski's (1987) 1imited survey of the Taiwanese nationa1
elite, the fact that he had to devise comp1ex research stratagems
to circumvent the respondents' mutual fears and hosti1ities
points to basic elite disunity.
The origin of nationa1 elite disunity apparent1y 1ies in the
process of nation-state formation. Constructing nation-states
out of previous1y disparate and partia11y autonomous territories
is typica11y such a vio1ent and conf1ict-ridden process,
invo1ving the repression of some elite groups by others, that
deep and unremitting elite disunity is a1most inevitable (Co1eman
1971, pp. 89-93). Bendix's (1978) treatise on nation-state
formation in the west and Japan amp1y demonstrates that nation-
state conso1idation everywhere resu1ted in disunified e1ites.
The formation of nation-states in Latin America after
emancipation from Spanish ru1e in the ear1y nineteenth century
required repeated efforts to suppress local e1ites by force
(Oszlak 1981). Johnson (1983) provides a graphic account of the
a1together similar resu1t of postco1onia1 nation-state
conso1idations in B1ack Africa and many other new1y emerging
nations in the 1960s and 1970s.
Thus, the historica1 record strong1y suggests that elite
disunity originates in the formation of nation-states. Disunity
is, in other words, the generic condition of nationa1 e1ites.
But there are two kinds of exceptions. First, the experience of
operating "home ru1e" regimes over longer periods under
re1ative1y benign colonial tute1age and/or of orchestrating 1arge
and po1itica11y comp1ex nationa1 independence movements sometimes
resu1ts in a consensua11y unified nationa1 elite from the date of
postco1onia1 independence. The United States, Canada, New
Zea1and, Australia, India, and a few other offshoots of the
British Empire are the principal examp1es. Second, defeat and
occupation of societies after wars sometimes resu1ts in
consensua11y unified e1ites from the date of postwar independence
because the previous1y most opposing elite factions have been
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liquidated (e.g., Austria during and after World War II). But
with these exceptions, the historical record strongly supports
the proposition that nation-state formation almost always results
in a disunified national elite.
The main political consequence of elite disunity is reqime
instabilitv. As a property of regimes, instability has several
meanings. Sanders (1981) identifies three meanings: (1) a high
incidence of political violence in the form of revolts, riots,
strikes, mass demonstrations, and individual actions; (2)
frequent changes in the makeup of governing coalitions and
cabinets; (3) the occurrence of coups d'etat or other government
overthrows. In our view, the first two meanings are not
sUfficiently discriminating because nearly all regimes at various
times would qualify as unstable in one or both respects. Only
the third meaning, suitably elaborated, distinguishes unstable
regimes in a clear-cut and theoretically useful fashion. Thus, a
political regime may be said to be unstable whenever government
executive power is subject to irreqular seizures. attempted
seizures. or widelv expected seizures by force. Concrete
indicators ofregime instability are revolutions, uprisings, or
coups d'etat aimed at changing the control of government
executive offices and not primarily orchestrated by another
nation-state. A regime may be classified as unstable during
periods when such seizures occur, are attempted, or are regarded
by informed persons as likely possibilities. So long as any of
these indicators of instability obtain, a regime's current mode
of functioning, whether "democratic" or "authoritarian" or
something else, is likely to be temporary.
Irregular, forcible power seizures are sufficiently frequent
and visible, or the expectation of them is so palpable, that
observers usually have little difficulty recognizing a regime as
unstable. Thus, Malloy (1985, p. 367) calculated that some 186
irregular seizures of government occurred in Bolivia since
independence in 1825. Veliz (1967, p. 278) counted 80
successful military coups in 18 Latin American countries between
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1920 and 1966. Grundy (1968) found 64 irregular seizures of
power in Black African nations between 1963 and 1968, and
Macridis (1986, p. 225) listed 26 coups in 16 countries of
Tropical Africa between 1970-1984. Similarly, it is usually not
hard to discern expectations of irregular power seizures among
informed observers of a regime. For example, a journalist
(Bonner 1988) who recently spent several months talking with
leaders and opponents of the democratic regime led by Alan Garcia
in Peru concluded: "The soldiers still exercise a de facto veto
over the actions of civilians, and many observers in Peru, both
peruvian and foreign, think that the question is not whether the
military will stage a coup but when. Between two and five years
is the general estimate" (p. 58).
Occasionally, however, there are regimes in which no
irregular power seizure or attempted seizure has recently
occurred and where it is debatable whether informed observers
regard such seizures as likely possibilities. Uruguay after its
civil war in 1904 to the years immediately preceding the military
coup in 1973 is an example. Chile, after the overthrow of the
Ibanez dictatorship in 1932 and down to the first year of the
Allende government in 1970-71, is another example. France during
the long-lasting Third Republic, 1875-1940, might be another. In
such ambiguous cases, many scholars and policymakers have
mistakenly regarded regimes as stable.
The primary reason for these inaccurate assessments has been
a failure to comprehend the underlying condition of elite
disunity. Though elites and regimes seem inextricably entwined,
analytically distinguishing between the basic structure of a
national elite and the characteristics of its political regime
allows one to postulate a causal relationship between elites and
regimes, in which elite structure is viewed as logically and
factually prior to regime stability. This leads to the
proposition that, for a lasting democratic transition to occur,
the national elite must first be transformed from disunity to
consensual unity. When analyzing regime changes, in short,
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researchers shou1d concentrate on the under1ying elite structure,
seeking recent or historica1 evidence of an elite transformation.
If no such evidence is found, the ana1yst shou1d presume that
the elite remains disunified and the regime remains unstab1e.
This conc1usion presumes that we know both what elite
transformations from disunity to consensual unity look 1ike and
the circumstances in which they may occur. Unfortunate1y,
po1itica1 socio1ogists have not exp10red these matters in depth.
We (Burton and Hig1ey 1987b) recent1y ana1yzed one kind of elite
transformation: the "elite sett1ement" in which warring elite
factions sudden1y and de1iberate1y reorganized their re1ations by
negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements,
thereby aChieving consensual unity and 1aying the basis for a
stab1e democratic regime. The elite sett1ement process is
exemp1ified by po1itica1 events in Eng1and in 1688-89, Sweden in
1808-09, and Colombia and Venezuela in the late 1950s. We
suspect that a second kind of transformation from disunity to
consensual unity occurs in two distinct steps. In step one, some
of the warring factions enter into sustained, peacefu1
co11aborationin electoral po1itics in order to mobilize a
reliable electoral majority, win elections repeatedly, and
thereby protect their interests by dominating government
executive power. In step two, the major hostile factions
opposing this coalition eventua1ly tire of losing elections, and,
seeing no other way to gain government power (for example,
through a coup), gradually abandon their distinct ideological and
policy stances and adopt essentia11y those of the winning
coalition. With this development, a consensually unified
national elite is created and a stable democratic regime rapidly
emerges. Examples include France and Ita1y during the past
quarter century: center-right elite coalitions formed, the
French Gau1lists and the Italian Christian Democrats plus
smaller elite factions in each country. These coalitions then
dominated electoral pOlitics in ways that eventual1y forced
radical leftist factions, principal1y the French Socialists and
11
the Italian Communists, to moderate
in order to compete effectively for
Higley 1978).
So far as we can determine, elite settlements and these
"two-step" elite transformations are, to date in modern history,
the only routes from a disunified to a consensually unified
national elite. They thus constitute the only indigenous bases
for changes from unstable to stable democratic (or proto-
democratic) regimes. But, as noted, such transformations rarely
occur. Conversely, elite transformations from consensual unity
to disunity are even rarer. Down to the present period at least,
consensually unified national elites, once formed, have
everywhere perpetuated themselves.
The rarity of elite transformations from consensual unity to
disunity has implications for the analysis of democratic
breakdowns. The much-discussed breakdowns of interwar Europe
(see Linz and stepan 1978) all occurred in nation-states whose
elites had been patently disunified since the time of nation-
state formation (e.g., German elites after 1871, see Baum 1981;
Hamilton1982). What broke down in interwar Europe were
democratic interludes in wider patterns of elite disunity and
regime instability. Possibly, an elite transformation from
consensual unity to disunity, and thus a regime change from
stability to instability, has recently occurred in the
Philippines, a nation-state which gave many indications of having
a consensually unified national elite and a stable democratic
regime from the end of American colonial tutelage in 1946 until
the spread of intraelite violence, culminating in several
military rebellions, during the 1980s.
Though elite transformations are fundamentally "elite
events," obviously mass variables are importante Elites always
need mass support. Mass conditions and orientations thus
establish fields of opportunity and constraint to which elites
must respond (see Field and Higley 1980, pp. 18-47). For
example, two-step elite transformations appear possible only
their ideologies and programs
executive office (Field and
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where a majority of voters are disposed, by virtue of their
socioeconomic and other conditions, to support elite electoral
appeals that essentially defend the status quo. Yet, as we
suggest below, no discernible mass configuration leads inexorably
to elite transformations. Despite dramatic chanqes in mass
conditions and orientations durin the modern historical eriod
the modal attern of western olitics was one of ersistent elite
disunity and resultinq reqime instability. We now briefly
describe this modal pattern.
THE MODAL PATTERN OF WESTERN POLITICS
For most of the period between 1500 and the Napoleonic Wars, only
eight western societies approached the political independence and
integration of modern nation-states: Denmark, England, France,
Portugal, Russia, Scotland, Spain, and Sweden (see Table 1).
During the first half of this period probably only England fully
met the nation-state standard in terms of territorial political
consolidation. Denmark was embroiled in an effort to retain
control of Sweden, France was periodically broken up in civil
wars over religious and social questions until late in the
seventeenth century, Portugal was subjugated by Spain between
1580 and 1640, Russia did not achieve national consolidation
until the seventeenth century under the Romanovs, Scotland was
not fully independent from England after 1652 and it disappeared
as a nation-state after merging with England in 1707, while Spain
was initially several distinct countries joined by a dynastic
union which only eventually led to territorial demarcation and
administrative centralization. A ninth political entity, the
United provinces of the Netherlands, threw off Spanish domination
in the 1580s, but the seven provinces, which separately appeared
to have consensually unified elites from the time of independence
(see Grever 1982), did not achieve nation-state consolidation
until the Napoleonic Wars. Throughout the eighteenth century,





of various semi-autonomous and non-contiguous
Finally, the united states, did not emerge as a
nation-state until the very end of the periodo
Disunitv as the Generic Condition of National Elites
By about 1600 all eight original societies-cum-nation-states had
reached levels of urbanization and commercialization
sufficiently complex that many elite positions required more or
less full-time attention by their incumbents. Though small
leisured classes of influential aristocrats and gentry continued
to exist, in showdown situations the decisive power-wielders
tended to be the persons and factions commanding the most
important bureaucratic organizations: monarchs and high state
officials, senior military officers, high-ranking ecclesiastics,
merchants and entrepreneurs heading important commercial
enterprises, and leaders of regional political bodies.
As national aggregations, these elites were clearly
disunified in the sense that wide and deep struggles for
political ascendancy typified their relationships. Elite
factions associated with monarchs and contenders for the throne
tended to back royal absolutism, while factions benefitting from
local autonomy resisted. The use of military force for purposes
of aggrandizement and pacification bulked large (Finer 1975; Mann
1986), and religious divisions made struggles between state-
building and state-resisting elites more bitter and complex
(Bendix 1978; see also Tilly 1975).
Political regimes in all these nation-states were
traditional monarchies in which government executive power was
transferred among successive rulers by principIes of
inheritance. But since there seldom was any widespread agreement
on the concrete application of these principIes, transfers of
executive power were subject to intrigues, challenges, and
usurpations. In Denmark, for example, struggle over the royal
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succession exploded in civil war during the 1530s, and in
England succession to the throne was precarious throughout the
second half of the sixteenth century. Even where transfers of
executive power among successive monarchs occurred peacefully--as
during Spain's "golden" sixteenth century--the mutual fear and
distrust of elite factions guaranteed incessant rivalries, plots,
and other frequently violent maneuvers aimed at dominating the
monarch.
In reality, these traditional monarchies simply embodied
elite disunity. The attempt to centralize political power in one
person and clique--the monarch and his or her retinue--reflected
the absence of mutually agreed power-sharing arrangements. In
Bendix's (1978, pp.218-43) view, traditional monarchies
confronted insoluble dilemmas--irreconcilable needs to both
concentrate and delegate royal authority, large and irreducible
elements of arbitrariness in monarchical actions, eminently
disputable processes of inheritance and succession, pervasive
uncertainty about the extent and limits of royal authority--the
only consequence of which could be regime instability. In these
fundamental respects, the persistence of traditional monarchies
everywhere epitomized the existence of disunified national
elites.
The First Elite Settlements
Down to the Napoleonic Wars, the relationship between elite
disunity and regime instability was broken only in England and
Sweden (see Table 1). In England's "Glorious Revolution" of
1688-89, and in sUbstantively similar events surrounding Sweden's
creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1808-09, elite
settlements occurred in which previously warring factions
suddenly and deliberately transformed their relations from
disunity to consensual unity. As we have argued (Burton and
Higley 1987b), these settlements originated in the recent
experience of costly but inconclusive elite conflict--the
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English civil wars and their Cromwellian aftermath plus thirty
years of bitter infighting between Tory and Whig factions during
the Restoration period, and in Sweden the struggle between Hat
and Cap factions throughout the eighteenth century. 1mmediate
precipitants were dramatic political crises: the birth of James
11's son in 1688 making probable a Catholic succession to the
throne of a Protestant country; the grave defeat Sweden suffered
at the hands of Russia in 1808, coupled with economic disarray.
The settlements depended for their success upon the
unprecedented forbearance and secret collusions of a handful of
skilled and experienced leaders, representing the major elite
factions, who rapidly negotiated compromises on the most
dangerous issues. And the predominantly unmobilized character of
nonelite populations apparently facilitated the settlements by
allowing elites sufficient autonomy to negotiate compromises.
These settlements established new arrangements for sharing
power, thereby greatly reducing elite insecurities. Henceforth,
most elite persons had reliable access to decision-making on
issues salient to them, and defeats on policy questions no
longer carried drastic penalties. Almost immediately after the
English and Swedish elite settlements, a prudent and restrained
pOlitics came into being, with contested elections taking place
at short intervals and eventually becoming democratized through
universal suffrage, and with executive power shifting from
monarchs to cabinets responsible to elected bodies. Thereafter,
even serious political challenges, such as England's Chartist
Movement during the l830s and radical labor movements in both
countries at the end of the nineteenth century, did not prevent
the peaceful transfer of executive power among different elite
factions according to the outcomes of regular, popular elections.
We sketch the elite settlements in England and Sweden
because they represent, within the frame of reference
specified, the onlv route in preindustrial societies from elite
disunity and regime instability to consensual elite unity and a
stable, proto-democratic political regime. without a settlement,
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the elite disunity that originates during nation-state formation
simply persists, guaranteeing that political regimes remain
unstable. This contention is borne out by the politics of the
other original western nation-states down to the Napoleonic Wars:
in none did anything resembling the English and Swedish elite
settlements occur, and all of their political regimes evidenced
instability throughout the periodo
persistence of Elite Disunitv Elsewhere
In Denmark, struggles among aristocratic and bourgeois elite
factions culminated in royal absolutism after 1665. A century of
rule by a few hundred landowners in league with the monarchy
followed, but was upset in the 1770s and 1780s by palace
intrigues and power grabs, amounting to successive coups d'etat.
In France during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, elites
in the court, the church, the military, and the major towns
became polarized over traditional versus rationalist views of
rank and privilege and over other conceptions of the good
society. Thechasm between the elite camps persisted, and in
1788-89 revolution broke out. In Portugal, independence from
Spain in 1640 was soon followed by court intrigues, the overthrow
of Afonso VI in 1668, and the assertion of royal absolutism;
which, as elsewhere, involved constant infighting among elite
factions bent on dominating the monarchical power.
Elite disunity was also evident in Russia and Spain. In
Russia during the seventeenth century, absolutist rule was
punctuated by sporadic uprisings which the Tsars ruthlessly
suppressed. After thirty-five years of "enlightened despotism"
under Peter The Great (1689-1725), court intrigues and military
interventions perpetuated regime instability. As Bendix (1978,
p. 597) notes, only two of the eight monarchs following Peter
during the eighteenth century attained the throne without
military intervention, and both were murdered. Seventeenth
century Spanish politics were dominated first by revolts against
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castilian heqemony and then by attempts by noble elite factions
to dominate the incompetent Charles II (1665-1700). Early in the
eiqhteenth century, spain broke up in civil war and reqional
revolts.It was patched toqether in 1716, then its politics
paralleled French pOlitics--a protracted strugg1e pittinq
reactionary aristocrats and church officials against modernizing
elite factions spearheaded by state officials and leaders of the
small bourgeoisie. At century's end, under another incompetent
king, Charles IV, court intriques swept Spain into its disastrous
French alliance, which produced an uprisinq aqainst the kinq, his
forced abdication in 1808, and Napoleon's imposition of his
brother Joseph on the Spanish throne.
In short, the uniform political pattern in all the earliest
western nation-states was elite disunity and regime instability,
a pattern originating in the process of nation-state formation.
Except in England and Sweden, where extraordinary circumstances
facilitated sudden and deliberate settlements, elite disunity and
regime instability persisted over several hundred years, despite
the ebb and flow of national fortunes and despite fairly steady
socioeconomic development. This pattern was not simply a
consequence of imperfect nation-state consolidation, traditional
monarchies, or preindustrialization. It persisted after these
nation-states fully consolidated, after their monarchies were
mostly replaced by republican qovernments, real or de facto, and
after substantial industrialization.
Elite Disunitv In the Nineteenth Century
Conquests by French revolutionary and Napoleonic armies turned
many small and precariously independent German and Italian
principalities into larqe territorial units. In 1815, the
Conqress of Vienna ratified these chanqes, thus reorqanizinq the
European political map (see Table 1). prussia emerqed as a major
nation-state, while the loosely consolidated Habsburq Empire
(after 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Empire) tried to control
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territories in Ita1y, .Eastern Europe, and the Ba1kans. Through
war in the 1860s, prussia exc1uded the Habsburg Empire from
German-speaking territories outside Austria proper, and in 1871
prussia estab1ished the German Reich. with French and prussian
he1p, the Kingdom of Sardinia-piedmont expanded, a1so reducing
the Habsburg Empire, and emerged in 1870 as the Ita1ian nation-
state. A10ng with France, Spain, and Russia, these countries
dominated continental Europe, though sma11er nation-states also
emerged--the Nether1ands from 1813, Be1gium from 1830,
switzer1and from 1848, Norway from 1884.
At various points during the nineteenth century, most of
these countries, plus Britain, Sweden, and Denmark, reached
industrial 1eve1s of socioeconomic deve1opment, and their
popu1ations came to inc1ude 1arge categories of manual industrial
and bureaucratic and service workers. This spread of an
industrial occupationa1 configuration created new e1ites
commanding labor unions, mass po1itica1 parties, new commercia1
enterprises, professiona1 associations, mass media organizations,
educationa1 institutions, and pub1ic sector agencies and
organizationsstemming from state expansion. But
industria1ization was not accompanied by any basic change in
elite structures or in the character of po1itica1 regimes.
E1ites in the original European nation-states, other than Eng1and
and sweden, remained disunified. If anything, elite disunity was
exacerbated by the French Revo1ution's aftershocks, by new e1ites
entering the po1itica1 arena, and by conf1icts between popu1ation
segments resu1ting from industria1ization. Moreover, the
process of forging new nation-states during the nineteenth
century near1y everywhere produced disunified nationa1 e1ites.
Thus, in Prussia, Be1gium, Germany after 1871, and Ita1y after
1870, e1ites disagreed fundamenta11y about the constitutions and
institutions on which their new nations rested, and they defended
or subverted governments according to their narrow interests.
Two exceptions, switzer1and and Norway, require brief
mention. Before entering the new Swiss federation in 1848,
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several, perhaps all, previously self-governing, geographically-
isolated swiss cantons had consensually unified elites as
outgrowths of late medieval "citizen communities." The swiss
constitutiqnal settlement of 1848 formed these cantonal elites
into a consensually unified national elite which has operated a
stable representative regime ever since. Somewhat by contrast,
Norway was controlled by Sweden between 1814 and 1884, with
Norwegian elites operating a "home rule" regime along
representative political lines. When Sweden relinquished
control in 1884, Norway emerged with a national elite that was
halfway through a two-step transformation. Between them,
conservative and liberal factions mobilized an electoral majority
and consistently excluded ostensibly revolutionary socialist
factions from government executive power until the latter
abandoned radicalism during the 1930s, allowing full consensual
unification (see Higley et al. 1976).
But elsewhere in nineteenth century Europe, elite disunity
persisted and produced frequent, often violent oscillations in
regime forms. Thus, in France a traditional monarchy was
restored in 1814-15, a "bourgeois monarchy" was installed in an
upheaval in 1830, a republican regime was instituted by revolt in
1848, an autocratic regime was established by coup d'etat in
1851, and another republican regime was instituted following the
suppression of the Paris Commune uprising of 1870. Elite
disunity and regime instability were equally conspicuous in
Spain: restoration of the monarchy in 1814; enforced
liberalization of the monarchy, involving a military coup,
between 1820-23; the military-backed "succession" of three-year-
old Queen Isabel III in 1833 and withdrawal of the former heir
presumptive to lead a "Carlist" revolt in the north; military
interventions which shifted power between liberal and
conservative factions in 1835, 1843,1854, and 1856; Isabel's
dethronement in 1868 and an interregnum of military rule and
civil war followed by her son 's acceptance of a constitutional
monarchy with nominally representative institutions in 1875.
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Portugal experienced a similar pattern of upheava1s--
disp1acement of the monarchy in 1820, a fai1ed insurrection in
1824, civil war in 1832-34, coups in 1836 and 1851, and an
attempted uprising in 1890.
In most other European nation-states, however, there were no
similar sequences of government overthrows. In Russia, prussia
and Germany, conservative elite factions used repression to
sustain monarchies that were revi1ed by e1ites 1eading bourgeois
and working-c1ass organizations and movements. In these
countries, and in Denmark, Be1gium and Ita1y, elite disunity was
suggested by deep ideo1ogica1 divisions between e1ites, and
regime instabi1ity was reflected in intrigues surrounding the
monarchica1 regimes and in numerous riots, strikes, and other
confrontations engineered by dissident e1ites.
Disunified E1ites and Unstab1e Democracies
When the nineteenth century ended, a11 western nation-states
except Russia had representative po1itica1 institutions invo1ving
significant practice of electoral po1itics. The material wea1th
produced by industria1ization enab1ed dominant e1ites temporari1y
to p1acate dissident e1ites and their f011owings, and the
suffrage was sti11 1arge1y restricted to those with a stake in
the existing socioeconomic order. Thus, e1ections did not
immediate1y become mere1y another way for warring factions to
undermine and destroy each other. For a whi1e, a number of
European nation-states appeared to have stab1e democratic
regimes, even though no basic elite transformation had occurred.
We must examine this situation further because it bears
direct1y on our argument that democracy is stab1e on1y when
e1ites are consensua11y unified. The long-1asting French Third
Repub1ic may seem to constitute a particu1ar1y c1ear exception.
For sixty-five years it suffered no forcible seizure of
government executive power, and it was regarded as one of the
major democracies of the modern age. If space a11owed, other
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seeming exceptions to our argument wou1d bear examination:
Ita1y's constitutiona1 monarchy from 1870 unti1 Musso1ini's
takeover in 1922-25; and, further afie1d, the Argentine regime
between 1912 and 1930, the Uruguayan regime between 1905 and the
late 19608, and the Chi1ean regime between 1933 and A11ende's
assumption of the presidency in 1970. In our view such
governments were inter1udes, if rather 10ng-1asting ones, in a
continuing pattern of elite disunity and regime instabi1ity.
Here we can on1y i11ustrate this interpretation by 100king at the
. French Third Repub1ic.
Despite certain conditions favoring an elite transformation,
the creation of the Third Repub1ic was not preceded, accompanied,
or fo110wed by unification of the disunified e1ites so evident in
France's ear1ier history. Among the monarchist factions who
he1d a majority of Nationa1 Assemb1y seats in the ear1y 1870s,
many peop1e favored a British-sty1e constitutiona1 monarchy
(Anderson 1977, p. 6). Repub1icans within the Assemb1y were
predominant1y moderate, as exemp1ified by their 1eader, Ado1phe
Thiers. Monarchists and repub1icans were thus potentia11y
capab1e of compromising. And radical factions in the Assemb1y
were in disarray after the Paris Commune debacle. In these
circumstances, an elite sett1ement was conceivab1e. A step in
this direction was the "fusionist" effort by 1eaders of the two
monarchist factions to have the Legitimist pretender, the
chi1d1ess Comte de Chambord, then in his fifties, take the throne
and be succeeded by the much younger Or1eanist pretender, the
Comte de Paris (Thomson 1969, pp. 80-83). The plan foundered on
Chambord's refusa1 of the 1imited monarchy being offered, a
refusa1 he couched in a dispute over the nationa1 flag. Had
Chambord accepted the fusionist plan, it might have become a key
e1ement in a comprehensive elite sett1ement.
Thus, the Third RepUb1ic was born, not in an elite
sett1ement but in an elite sta1emate (Hoffman 1963). Estab1ished
by a one vote margin in the Nationa1 Assemb1y in 1875, it was
never viewed by monarchist, Bonapartist, or 1eft-wing elite
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factions as more than a temporary expedient (Thomson 1969).
These several factions mobilized major segments of the business
c1ass, the church hierarchy, the military, the civil service, and
the working class. Predictably, expectations of forcible
seizures of government power became a regular feature of French
politics. During the 1880s there was considerable support for a
coup by ex-General Boulanger, but he balked at the last minute.
The Ligue des Patriotes attempted a coup in 1889. In 1898 and
1899, during the divisive Dreyfus affair, two serious coup plots
were uncovered. In 1933, Action Francaise and other proto-
fascist groups conspired to overthrow the Daladier government.
The last years of the Republic, before, during and after the
Popular Front government of 1936-1938, involved severe elite
disunity, as evidenced by the alacrity with which a major portion
of the elite seized the opportunity created by military defeat in
1940 to dismant1e the Republic and to establish the corporatist,
semi-fascist Vichy regime (paxton 1972).
Similar analyses of continuing elite disunity and its
destabilizing effects on democratic regimes apply to most other
European and all Latin American nation-states during the latter
part of the nineteenth century and much of this century. Weimar
Germany and the Austrian Repub1ic during the interwar period
before Hitler took over provide two especially clear-cut and
consequential examples (see Hamilton 1982), but so do Italy,
Spain, and Portugal in the same periodo
Did this modal pattern of western pOlitics persist after
World War II? Fol10wing our argument, one must examine each
country for clear evidence of an elite transformation from
disunity to consensual unity, either through a sudden and
deliberate settlement or a two-step transformation. Apart from
Russia and its East European satellites, and possibly Portugal,
all the unstab1e European countries discussed above appear to
have experienced an elite transformation (see Table 1). In
Austria, the proDorz system and other power-sharing arrangements
that elites secretly negotiated in the late 1940s probably
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constituted an elite settlement, thus laying the basis for the
first stable democratic regime in Austria's history (see steiner
1972; Stiefbold 1974). Similarly, the intensive elite
negotiations carried on in Spain after Franco's death in 1975
produced a settlement terminating more than four centuries of
regime instability (see Gunther et al. 1986; Share 1987).
Elsewhere--in West Germany and Belgium during the 1950s and early
1960s, and in France and Italy during the 1960s and 1970s--two-
step elite transformations occurred as the electoral dominance of
center-right elite coalitions gradually forced left-wing factions
to abandon socialist orthodoxies and join their "bourgeois"
opponents in defending and operating liberal democratic regimes
presiding over capitalist economies.
Summary
Table 1 summarizes the patterns underlying our contention that,
barring special colonial legacies like those in the United States
or the Netherlands, and barring exceptional historical and
geographical circumstances like those of Switzerland, elite
disunity and regime instability have been so widespread and
persistent as to constitute the modal pattern of western
politics. Locating the origins of elite disunity in the
formations of western nation-states, the table illustrates our
contention that the relationship between elite disunity and
regime instability simply persists, regardless of changes in
regime forms or in the configurations of mass publics, until one
of three elite transformations occurs: (1) a sudden and
deliberate elite settlement, (2) a more gradual two-step elite
transformation, or (3) a "revolutionary elite transformation" to
the condition of ideological unity (which because of our focus we
have not examined). Finally, Table 1 suggests that only after an
elite settlement or a two-step transformation do previously
unstable regimes become stable along representative lines that
are conducive to the rapid or gradual spread of democratic
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po1itics. In short, within the frame of reference specified,
specia1 colonial 1egacies, elite sett1ements, and two-step elite
transformations have constituted the on1v routes to stab1e
democratic po1itica1 regimes in modern western history. We now
suggest some imp1ications of this ana1ysis for the current
discussion of democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns.
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND BREAKDOWNS RECONSIDERED
The.distinction between democratic, tota1itarian, and
authoritarian regimes has been a mainstay of comparative
po1itica1 socio10gy, but successin deve10ping a general theory
of p01itica1 continuity and change centering on this distinction
has been slight. A serious impediment is the fuzziness in
distinguishing between democratic and authoritarian regimes.
Whi1e Linz (1964; 1975) and others have offered sound
distinctions between tota1itarian and authoritarian regimes, so
long as the former retained something 1ike their pristine
Sta1inist and Hit1erite forms, the ana1ytica1 boundary between
authoritaria~ and democratic regimes has been much 1ess
convincing1y drawn. This is ref1ected by the numerous concepts
that seeming1y combine authoritarian and democratic e1ements:
authoritarian-popu1ist, sing1e-party, revo1utionary,
mObi1izationa1, tute1ary, and even post-authoritarian regimes.
Moreover, po1itica1 changes have made the ana1ytica1 dichotomy
into a sieve, as numerous countries have osci11ated between
various authoritarian and democratic regime forms.
Reacting to these regime osci11ations, comparative po1itica1
socio10gy has deve10ped an osci11atory pattern. Thus, during the
1950s and ear1y 1960s, when many new1y independent deve10ping
countries seemed to be conso1idating democratic regimes, and when
most Latin American countries seemed to be moving toward
democracy, comparativists were preoccupied with theories about
the socioeconomic requisites of democratic regimes (e.g., Lipset
1959; Cutright 1963), the po1itica1 cu1tures in which they are
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ostensibly rooted (Lipset 1963: Almond and Verba 1963), and other
aspects of political development or evolution toward democracy
(see Huntington 1968; Huntington and Dominguez 1975). Beginning
in the mid-1960s, however, the fledgling democratic regimes of
many developing countries were overthrown and replaced by
authoritarian regimes. During the 1970s, comparativists thus
became preoccupied with "democratic breakdowns" (Linz and Stepan
1978), the role of the military in politics (Nordlinger 1977;
Perlmutter 1977), and the nature of "bureaucratic-authoritarian"
as well as other non-democratic but also non-totalitarian regimes
(O'Donnell 1973; Collier 1980). Beginning in the late 1970s, a
number of authoritarian regimes, particularly in Latin America
and Southern Europe, again gave way to more democratic ones.
Accordingly, scholars are now preoccupied with "democratic
transitions" or "transitions from authoritarian rule" (O'Donnell
et al. 1986; Malloy and Seligson 1987; Needler 1987; Baloyra
1987).
We have outlined an approach to the study of regime
creation, persistence, and change that avoids this oscillatory,
reactive pattern. Thus, any tendency to accord watershed
importance to the latest regime changes in countries with long
records of instability should be resisted unless compelling
evidence demonstrates that the necessary elite transformations
have occurred. Studies of "democratic breakdowns," such as those
collected by Linz and Stepan (1978), provide much evidence of
long-standing regime instability rooted in continuing elite
disunity. But such studies fail to observe that, without some
fundamental transformation to consensual unity, any outcome other
than breakdown was and is unlikely. Similarly, discussions of
recent transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes in
Latin America and Southern Europe generally fail to ask whether
the regime changes were preceded or accompanied by shifts from
elite disunity to unity. Again, without such elite
transformations, these democratic transitions are likely to be
short-lived swings in regime instability.
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An important step toward recognizing the significance of
elite transformations is the recent attention paid to "elite
pacts." O'Donne11 and Schmitter (1986, p. 37), define an elite
pact as "an exp1icit, but not a1ways pub1ic1y exp1icated or
justified, agreement among a se1ect set of actors which seeks to
define (or better, to redefine) ru1es governing the exercise of
power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests'
of those entering into it." Such an elite pact rough1y
approximates our concept of an elite sett1ement, though the
1atter is more comprehensive and mu1tifaceted. The importance of
elite pacts has been noted in the democratic transitions of
Colombia in 1957-58 (Wi1de 1978; Hart1yn 1984), Venezuela in 1958
(Kar1 1986), and Spain in 1977-79 (Gunther et al. 1986).
O'Donne11 and Schmitter (1986, pp. 37-9) doubt that such pacts
are necessary preconditions for transition to stab1e democracy,
but they think pacts enhance its probabi1ity. They observe, for
examp1e, that two of the three countries that escaped the post-
1964 wave of democratic breakdowns in Latin America--Co1ombia and
Venezue1a--were "pacted democracies." In our view, the third
country, Costa Rica, escaped breakdown because in 1948 its e1ites
entered into a sett1ement, though not a formal pact (see Pee1er
1985). Moreover, O'Donne11 and Schmitter notice that even the
long-1asting, but "unpacted," democratic regimes in Chile after
1933 and Uruguay after 1904 osci11ated to authoritarian forms in
1973. As we have suggested, those regimes--1ike the French Third
Repub1ic and severa1 other long-1asting, more or 1ess democratic
western regimes--were unstab1e because they did not originate in
fundamental elite transformations from disunity to consensual
unity. They rested instead on fragi1e coa1itions and sta1emates
among basica11y disunified e1ites, and their comparative1y long
durations probab1y depended on a good measure of 1uck. Sooner or
1ater they were 1ike1y to break down in the face of a po1itica1
crisis.
A1though the focus on elite pacts and other recent e1ite-
centered ana1yses are steps forward, they introduce a potentia11y
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troub1esome amount of indeterminacy. Thus, O'Donne11 and
Schmitter (1986, p. 5) stress "the high degree of indeterminacy
embedded in situations where unexpected events (fortuna),
insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices,
confusion about motives and interests, p1asticity, and even
indefinition of po1itica1 identities, as we11 as the ta1ents of
specific individua1s (virtu), are frequent1y decisive in
determining the outcomes." Like Hami1ton's (1982) penetrating
study of the breakdown of democracy in weimar Germany, O'Donne11
and Schmitter (1986, p. 19) adopt a position of "structural
indeterminacy" when ana1yzing recent transitions from
authoritarian ru1e. Simi1ar1y, Ma11oy's (1987, p. 237) ana1ysis
of recent regime changes in Latin America notes that there is
a key vo1untary dimension to the process that...prec1udes neat
deterministic theories based on general 1aws."
Our effort to specify the basic forms of nationa1 e1ites,
their origins, and their consequences provides a way around what
may otherwise be a theoretica1 dead-end. Whi1e more systematic
and exp1icit in its concepts and c1aims than much current work,
our approach nevertheless respects the messiness of politics and
political history. Our concepts steer a middle course between
grand theory and a retreat to local history. We urge those who
study democratic breakdowns and democratic transitions to look
first at elites, and to investigate basic patterns and
transformations of elite relationships. This approach is
decidedly not monocausal, however. We recognize that religion,
class, ethnicity, technology, demography, geography, economic
development, and the "demonstration effects" of other countries'
pOlitics (Bendix 1978) may affect elite relationships and the
forms of political regimes. But we deny that such forces lead
inexorably to democratic transitions or breakdowns. Instead, we
see national elites as filtering these forces, with each type of
elite giving a broadly predictable thrust to the functioning of
political regimes.
Finally, our approach implies much caution about the
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prospects for stable democracy in contemporary developing
nations. The strong tendency for disunified elites to persist,
evident in the west almost up to the present, and evident today
in most Third World countries, calls for a shift in thinking
about the mechanisms through which stable democracies are
established. stable democracies do not emerge simply by writing
constitutions, holding elections, expanding human rights,
accelerating economic growth, or exterminating leftist
insurgencies. The vital step is the consensual unification of
previously disunified elites. Except in a few instances growing
out of international warfare, such elite transformations have
resulted primarily from internal situations and contingencies.
This strongly suggests that western countries can do little to
promote stable democracies where they do not now existo Indeed,
it may be that western policies--in particular those of the
united states--have done more harm than good, often exacerbating
elite disunity and thus actually weakening prospects for the
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Table l. Types and Origins of National Elites in Selected
Western Nation-states: A Schematic View
Nation-state Formation Elite Tvpe(s) origin of CU Elite
England (late medieval) DU to 1689 Elite settlement
CU 1688-1988
Denmark (late medieval) DU to 1901
CU 1935-88
Scotland (late medieval) DU to 1707
Portugal (late medieval) DU to 1980s
Spain (from 16th cent) DU to 1977
CU 1979-88
Sweden (from 16th cent.) DU to 1809
CU 1809-1988
Russia (from 17th cent.) DU to 1917
IU 1921-88
France (late 17th cent) DU to 1960
CU 1981-88
U.S.A. (from 1789) CU 1789-1988
Netherlands (from 1813) CU 1813-1988















Colonial "home rule" and
independence struggle
Fusion of provincial elites





Elite Type(s) Origin of CU Elite
DU to 1890s 2-Step transformation
CU 1961-1988 1900-61
switzerland (from 1848) CU 1848-1988 Fusion of cantonal elites
Italy (from 1870) DU to 1948 2-Step transformation 1948-80
CU 1980-88
Germany (from 1871) DU to 1933 Revolutionary trans. 1933
IU 1933-45 2-Step transformation 1948-66
CU 1966-88
Norway (from 1884) CU 1935-88 2-Step trans. 1884-1935
Elite settlement 1945-48Austria (from 1919 or DU to 1938
earlier) CU 1948-88
Abbreviations: CU = Consensually Unified; DU = Disunified; IU =
Ideologically Unified.
